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INTRODUCTION
With his article “Normative preconditions
for the assessment of mental disorder”
Stier (2013) is presenting a thought-
provoking piece of work and I agree with
many of his conclusions. This is cer-
tainly true of Stier’s main thesis that the
demarcation line between mental health
and mental disorder cannot plausibly be
gained on the level of neurobiology alone,
but is in need of additional value judg-
ments. However, I think that this specific
“antireductionist claim” holds true also
in somatic medicine. Hence, the “medi-
cal model,” rightly understood, seems to
be fully appropriate for assessing men-
tal disorder. Moreover, I suggest to be
very restrictive in discussing the concept
of psychiatric disease in the language of
reductionism, since this might, contrary to
Stier’s own intentions, be easily misunder-
stood as water on the mills of methodolog-
ical antireductionism in psychiatry.
SETTING THE STAGE
Making use of Ayala’s (1974) influen-
tial differentiations between reductionism
(and the corresponding debates) on the
levels of metaphysics (ontology), episte-
mology, and methodology, reductionist
concerns vis-à-vis psychiatry primarily
refer to the last level. As a practical sci-
ence, psychiatry is mainly concerned with
methods or strategies of preventing, ail-
ing, or curing mental disorders. These
strategies in turn are interrelated with
methods of properly explaining and diag-
nosing such disorders. In contrast, what-
ever psychiatrists or their critics hold
on the level of ontology or epistemol-
ogy seems relevant to psychiatric work
(only) in so far as it determines outlooks
onmethodology—especially in interacting
with patients and in treating their disor-
ders. When it comes to the latter, mat-
ters of causation play the crucial role.
And here, I urge, one should distinguish
between two questions: (i) how mental
dysfunctions (e.g., delusions, depression,
mania, decrease in cognitive functions
etc.) is/can at all be “caused” by brain dys-
function; (ii) how relevant systemic brain
dysfunction is caused by neurobiological
processes on lower levels—e.g., on the lev-
els of circuits, cells, or genes.
The first question points to the central
and perennial problem of the mind-brain
debate and from here cuts throughout psy-
chiatry (so also Kendler, 2008, p. 9). For
these problems and questions, it ultimately
does not matter whether we talk about
healthy or disordered minds and brains.
I do not know whether psychiatry might
make a genuine contribution to solve these
problems. Likewise, we most often do not
know what proponents or critics of bio-
logical psychiatry hold in these matters.
Beyond the shared views that the “mental
realm,” disordered or healthy, is (a) both
very real and very important to ourselves
and (b) brain-based, there exist many con-
flicting views and intuitions. Key problems
seem to be the questions of mental cau-
sation, agent causality, and free will. In
this paper, Stier does not address them in
their own right, but he suggests assuming
full explicability of the mental in “purely
physical terms” (p. 2).
The second question lies at the bottom
of what mainstream neuroscience, and in
fact life science in general, is doing today.
Here, scientists successfully try reduction-
ist strategies to count for certain biologi-
cal phenomena by explaining them on a
relatively lower level (circuits, nerve cells,
synaptic spaces) and by isolating them
from as many relevant background condi-
tions as seems fruitful1. Here again, Stier
is ready to accept—if only for the argu-
ment’s sake—“that environmental influ-
ences, too, are explicable mechanistically”
(p. 2). Making such (non-eliminative)
reductionist assumptions upon both ques-
tions, he rightly emphasizes that the truth
of his “anti-reductionist claim” regarding
the notion of mental disease does not
depend on metaphysical or methodolog-
ical anti-reductionism with regard to the
mental.
A PARTIALLY NORMATIVE CONCEPT
OF (MENTAL) DISEASE
Stier holds that “mental disorders cannot
be completely reduced to neuronal or
molecular processes” (p. 1). His justifi-
cation for this “anti-reductionist claim”
is the above stated “main thesis” which
holds that in the field of neuropsychi-
atric disorders, the borderline between
health and disease is value-laden. Unable
to argue for this in any detail, I whole-
heartedly agree with the view that the
concept of mental disorder is partly nor-
mative. Being mentally diseased means (or
should mean) to be in some or other dys-
functional and unwelcome mental state
that thus should ideally be prevented or
treated. Imprecise as these stipulated eval-
uative criteria and their originators are,
I also agree with the view that individ-
ual and social value judgments cannot be
read off from mere neurobiological facts2.
We principally cannot tell from scratch
1See Kaiser (2011) for a diligent analysis.
2See Barker and Kitcher (2014), p. 70ff. for a defense
of value invention.
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whether some functional neurobiological
state corresponds to a mental disease or
not. Rather, we can only do so within a
partly evaluative background frame.
However, do these insights not hold
true for diseases in general, for disorders
within and without psychiatry? For so-
called somatic disorders, this might not
always be as obvious as in the realm of
psychiatric diseases. Take an infection that,
if untreated, would rapidly lead to death
without any other adverse symptoms. One
might argue that premature death is a
purely descriptive term independent of
it’s being unwelcome to most people. But
the same could be said about neuro-
psychiatric disorders that lead to perma-
nent coma or benign delusions. Where
single disorders, in the mental as well as in
the non-mental sphere, seem to be expli-
cable without recourse to values, the gist
of the whole concept of disease refers to
unwelcome malfunctioning (including the
functions of living or being conscious) and
can be traced, I think, in each of its sub-
types. Unable to further argue in favor of
a partly normative concept of disease at
this occasion, let me at least emphasize that
this is one of the standard views (often
referred to as partial “constructivism”) in
the contested field of theories of health and
disease (see Murphy, 2008). The current
tendency to blurr or to give up the dis-
tinction between psychiatry and neurology
could, by the way, be seen as yet another
indicator for the non-exceptionalist status
of mental disorders (see Perring, 2010).
THE MEDICAL MODEL
Stier refers to the “medical model” (MM)
without giving a complete explicit defi-
nition. In the literature, MM is indeed a
commonly used paradigm; it is seen, how-
ever, to allow for “minimal and strong
interpretations” (Murphy, 2010, pp. 3–13).
Stier’s understanding of MM comes in
pieces. On a purely descriptive level it is
said to stand in competition with psycho-
analytical and other explanations of men-
tal disorders (p. 7) and to substantially
parallelize body-environment interaction
in the genesis of cancer and brain-
environment interaction in the genesis of
depression (p. 2). Critically,MM is accused
of inadequately explaining psychiatric dis-
orders: “psychiatric disorders [. . . ] may
turn out to be purely physical if we adhere
to the medical model [. . . ] and cease to be
mental” (p. 8). But why should this be the
case?
One possible answer could be MM’s
alleged tie to a value-neutral concept of
disease. However, this is not only con-
tested by many and with good reasons
(see above), but also by Stier himself. He
clearly admits that “[. . . ] it is not that
bodily diseases are value-free whereas psy-
chiatric disorders are value-laden. Both
rest on normative assumptions.” But then
he continues: “In one field we sim-
ply share them, in the other we don’t”
(p. 5). Both observations of the last sen-
tence seem questionable: Quite a num-
ber of “bodily” conditions are contested
with regard to their “diseasedness”—e.g.,
limited reproductive or sexual functions,
moderately decreased hearing, or mod-
erately diminished memory capacities in
“normal aging.” Arguably, it is normative
aspects that will determine demarcations.
In any case, MM does not seem commit-
ted either to value neutrality in the con-
cept of disease, or to the indisputability of
the underlying values. On the other hand,
value dissent in the psychiatric domain is
by no means ubiquitous. After all, delu-
sions, anxiety disorders, depression, or
addiction do not appear very attractive,
neither from inside nor from outside.
Hence, contrary to Stier, MM should
in my eyes be properly understood as
rightly holding a thoroughgoing non-
exceptionalist view toward the expli-
cability of psychiatric disorders. This
view indeed seems to be the main
stream position in neuroscience. It implies
optimism with regard to neuroscientific
contributions to diagnostic and thera-
peutic progress in psychiatry. But, again,
it does neither imply viewing the con-
cept of psychiatric disorder as value-
independent nor viewing the mental
realm as eliminable by neurobiological
approaches.
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSTICS
Suppose, you diagnose an individual
patient with certain symptoms as suffer-
ing frommental disorder Z. In an idealized
nutshell this presupposes: (1) a multi-
dimensional demarcation between men-
tal sanity and mental diseasedness, where
those symptoms indicate disorder; (2) a
taxonomy of specific psychiatric diseases,
one of them called Z; (3) valid indica-
tors and tests for Z; (4) positive testing
for indicators of Z in the concrete patient.
Each of these steps has its problems. But
only (1) seems value-dependent in the
way described by Stier, i.e., relative to
human flourishing and human interests.
With regard to (2) there is malleability
and ongoing change in both the bodily
and the psychiatric dimension of med-
ical practice: fine-tuning and re-tuning
according to some symptoms or other,
to locations, or to (assumed) underly-
ing causal paths. The main values that
reign nosology are coherence and thera-
peutic success, I think. (3) is, again, an
ongoing process according to medical evi-
dence, having repercussions to (2) and
being reigned by the very same values
of coherence and therapeutic effective-
ness. Finally, diagnosing a given patient
should involve testing her according to
best available parameters, with results of
presuppositions (1) to (3) in the back.
Hence, in psychiatry, a patient showing up
with certain behavioral symptoms could
conceivably be tested for neurobiologi-
cal indicators, resulting in the diagnosis
Z—without loosing sight of the mental.
Determining a mental disorder in this way
is not guilty of any problematic reduction-
ist credo.
THE INNER LIFE OF PSYCHIATRIC
PATIENTS
Granting potential causal relevance to
a multitude of external influences, psy-
chiatrists would finally be ill advised
to look for brain function in isolation
rather than in context. But turning exter-
nal effects—e.g., psychologically stressful
life events—into background conditions
of pathogenesis, does not imply neglect-
ing their causal role. Nor does it imply
ignoring the importance of preventing
such adverse factors in the first place, or
excluding psychotherapy from the agenda
of psychiatry. Likewise, nothing in a
methodologically reductionist approach to
psychiatric research compels scientists or
doctors to ignore or belittle the enor-
mous importance of patients’ conscious
experiences. If such unfortunate “prac-
tical reductionisms” nevertheless occur,
they can neither legitimately be nobilized
nor criticized as a sequel of biological
psychiatry.
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From all we know and foresee, detailed
knowledge about one’s inner mental
life needs first-person experience or, as
a weak approximate substitute, third-
person encounter. Listening to psychiatric
patients’ directly or indirectly describing
their subjective experiences thus seems
irreplaceable for assessing the subjective
impact of mental disease as well as for an
understanding interaction with patients.
Nevertheless, using neurobiological tools
for diagnosing and monitoring treat-
ment might in principle be possible and
helpful.
SUMMING UP
Stier holds that the classification of cer-
tain mental states as disorders is value-
dependent and therefore cannot be read
off from neurobiology. Contra Stier, how-
ever, this plausible view does in no regard
discredit the medical model (MM) as “the
one and only bedrock of psychiatry” (p.
1). Rather, MM is uncommitted to a nat-
uralist theory of disease. As Stier himself
admits, values can be seen as indispensible
also in demarcating bodily diseasedness.
Some of these diseases and values might
be as contested as in psychiatry. MM’s
upshot is a non-exceptionalist view on
the explicability of psychiatric disorders—
and subsequently on their diagnostic and
therapeutic in-principle accessibility on a
biological level.
Finally, framing and selling a partially
constructivist position regarding (mental)
disease as an anti-reductionist view, is both
unusual and misleading. Affirming such
constructivism should not get confounded
with common and problematic objections
that blame biologically oriented psychia-
try as metaphysically or methodologically
reductionist. Yet another distinct problem
might be an unfortunate practical negli-
gence of patients’ inner life within modern
psychiatry. Such “practical reductionism”
can and should be defeated within a neu-
robiological orientated psychiatry.
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